Research/loom-ws-hitl
0-dayNo CVEMediumPublic

Loom, the chat socket drops the approval list the ordinary invoke still sends

An in-group caller with invoke can open the agent websocket. HTTP invoke loads ApprovalPolicy rows onto the runtime payload. The socket never queries them. The lab showed the list missing. It did not finish a dangerous tool.

Name
Loom, the chat socket drops the approval list the ordinary invoke still sends
Type
0-day analysis
CVE
n/a
CVE Risk
medium
Disclosure Status
public
Vendor
Loom
Affected
Loom for AWS. Container SUCCESS on v1.9.0 (a3050669f5b4c83210a44ed4346f17e01641e82f). invoke_agent_websocket and invoke_agent_ws are unchanged on v1.10.3 (cc10ab08573087fa12154f7c8181ffcd985fea88). Not re-run in a container on v1.10.3. In-group invoke on a custom-code agent. Unauthenticated websocket invoke is closed. IAM SigV4 runtimes are out of reach.
Published
16 Nov 2026
Updated
16 Nov 2026
Tags
0-day, loom, aws, cwe-862, websocket, hitl, authenticated

The socket learned a name and dropped the list

After the unauthenticated chat socket was closed, I read the authenticated one. A fix that learns who you are can still forget the rule it was supposed to carry. HTTP invoke loads every enabled approval policy and, when that list is non-empty, copies it onto the payload. The websocket handler never runs the query.

Notes and the loopback client: abraxas/loom-ws-hitl, loom-ws-hitl-Abraxas-Labs.py. @abraxas_null. Product tree: awslabs/loom.

Someone who can already talk to an agent in their own group can open the live socket instead of the ordinary invoke. The ordinary path sends the operator's pause rules with the prompt. The socket sends the prompt without those rules. You still have to be logged in. A stranger gets an error and the connection closes. The lab proved the list is missing from the socket payload. It did not complete a dangerous tool. I am not going to narrate a tool finishing, because that is not what the run showed. The high integrity on the score is the gate that was supposed to stop the tool, and that gate was not in the message.

Loom, no CVE on this one. CWE-862. Medium 6.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N). Remote. Low privilege: invoke, same group, not a registry admin and not a super-admin. No extra click. Scope unchanged, because it is an agent the caller can already reach. Confidentiality none, availability none, integrity high. Confidence about 72 percent. That number is on the omit, which the lab printed. It is not on a finished tool call. Not code execution.

Why I opened this handler again

v1.7.4 left WS /api/agents/{id}/ws open. The close is real. invoke_agent_websocket at invocations.py line 1853 reads the first frame and calls authenticate_bearer_token on token before the agent lookup. No token, and the reply is {"type": "error", "content": "Unauthorized"} with close code 1008. Then invoke, then the agent, then check_resource_group_access. session_start comes after all of that. I labbed the unauthenticated side so I would not confuse it with this finding. session-start=0. I am not refiling CVE-2026-103956, the HTTP unauthenticated super-admin fixed in v1.6.1, or CVE-2026-103957 and CVE-2026-103958, the v1.7.0 OAuth disclosure and MCP/A2A request forgery.

What that close did not touch is the payload a few dozen lines later.

The pause list is a table of rules: stop and ask a person before this tool runs. HTTP invoke loads those rows. The socket, built for the back-and-forth case, never learned the table.

Two builders

Around invocations.py lines 1779 to 1834 the HTTP handler does this:

Python
approval_policies_payload: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None
active_policies = db.query(ApprovalPolicy).filter(ApprovalPolicy.enabled == True).all()
if active_policies:
    approval_policies_payload = [p.to_dict() for p in active_policies]

That list is passed into invoke_agent_stream as approval_policies. invoke_agent in agentcore.py copies it when the list is non-empty:

Python
if approval_policies:
    payload["approval_policies"] = approval_policies

Empty means the key is absent, which is the correct result when nobody configured a policy. Non-empty means the runtime sees the operator's rules. I watched that. The authenticated HTTP payload included approval_policies. The lab count was 1.

invoke_agent_ws at agentcore.py line 217 has no such parameter. The websocket route never queries ApprovalPolicy. After the group check it builds a call with the prompt, the session, the actor, optional MCP connectors, a model id, and a guardrail. The dict it sends is:

Python
payload: dict[str, Any] = {
    "type": "prompt",
    "prompt": prompt,
    "session_id": session_id,
    "actor_id": actor_id or "loom-agent",
}

Connectors, model, and guardrail are added only if the frame carried them. Policies are not an optional field the caller forgot. They are not a field. The authenticated socket payload keys were type, prompt, session_id, actor_id. No policies. ws-approval-policies=0.

The custom-code runtimes apply the pause from that list. If the key never arrives, a cold session has nothing to match. No approval row is created, so the decide-owner check is never asked. I did not take a tool over the line. The sentence I will stand behind is narrower: the gate that was supposed to be in the payload was not in the payload. I:H is that gate.

Same group only. check_resource_group_access runs before session_start. connector_ids on the frame still go through assert_bindable. Not a cross-group bug, and not a bind bypass.

What I tried that was the old bug

First frame, no token. I wanted to see if "we authenticate now" was a comment. It was not. type=error, content Unauthorized, close 1008, and the session-start counter stayed at zero. That surface is closed. Writing it up again would be refiling a fix.

Second, I assumed the socket signed the runtime call the way a serious AWS client would. It does not. The comment in invoke_agent_ws says so in plain language: no SigV4, bearer only, and a runtime that expects SigV4 rejects the handshake. IAM-authorized runtimes are out of reach from this route. A JWT authorizer, the same shape HTTP invoke already forwards, is the one the socket can speak to. I stopped treating "any deployed agent" as the population.

Third, I wanted a dangerous tool to run so the oracle would be an effect instead of a missing key. That is the overclaim. The run captured keys. HTTP had the list. The socket did not. A result frame from a capture harness is not a tool the policy should have stopped. I am leaving it as an omit.

What the caller gets

Method What it grants Axis Lab or inferred
Unauthenticated WS /api/agents/{id}/ws Error Unauthorized, close 1008, no session_start. Closed Lab-proven. unauth=Unauthorized, session-start=0
POST /api/agents/{id}/invoke, in-group, authenticated Runtime payload includes approval_policies when any row is enabled. The gate is present Lab-proven. http-approval-policies=1
Authenticated WS /api/agents/{id}/ws, in-group invoke Payload keys type, prompt, session_id, actor_id. The policy list is absent. Integrity. The gate that should stop the tool is missing. Lab-proven omit. ws-approval-policies=0. A dangerous tool was not completed.
Same socket against an IAM SigV4 runtime Handshake is not signed. The runtime does not accept it. Closed Source. The function sets Authorization only from a caller bearer.
Another group's agent on this socket check_resource_group_access before session_start. Closed Source, and this lab was same-group. Not a cross-group oracle.
connector_ids for a server the caller cannot bind assert_bindable. Closed Source. Not the finding.
A later approval decision by the wrong user Decide-owner still refuses a different caller, but this path creates no approval row. The check does not run Inferred from the omit. Not a labbed decide call.
Reading secrets, or knocking the agent over Not shown. Confidentiality none, availability none Not claimed. C:N / A:N.

I:H is the third row. Not a tool I watched do harm. The policy list is what HTTP uses to pause. The socket left it out. If you need the effect, you do not have it from me.

Still closed

Surface Why it stays closed
Unauthenticated invoke on the socket First frame JWT. Lab: Unauthorized, close 1008, session-start=0.
CVE-2026-103956 Unauthenticated super-admin on HTTP. Fixed in v1.6.1. The socket uses the same bearer helper.
CVE-2026-103957, CVE-2026-103958 OAuth disclosure and MCP/A2A request forgery. Fixed in v1.7.0. Not this route.
Cross-group invoke Group check on the agent. Same group only.
IAM SigV4 runtimes The socket does not sign. Out of reach.
HTTP invoke of the same agent Still copies approval_policies when the list is non-empty. Lab count 1.
Empty policy table Omitting the key is correct when there is nothing to send. The bug is an enabled row that HTTP sends and the socket never loads.
Code execution Not demonstrated. Not claimed.

The ADK partner-tool gap, where a method is patched and never called, is a different pack. This one is only the missing list on the wire.

What the container printed

In-group custom-code agent. One enabled policy. HTTP invoke and the socket, side by side, plus the unauthenticated control.

Plain text
python3 loom-ws-hitl-Abraxas-Labs.py
Plain text
SUCCESS LOOM-190-WS-HITL unauth=Unauthorized session-start=0 http-approval-policies=1 ws-approval-policies=0 LOOM-190-WS-HITL-WITNESS

That SUCCESS is from a container of Loom v1.9.0, commit a3050669f5b4c83210a44ed4346f17e01641e82f. On v1.10.3, commit cc10ab08573087fa12154f7c8181ffcd985fea88, invoke_agent_websocket still never queries ApprovalPolicy, and invoke_agent_ws still builds the prompt dict without the list. The HTTP builder still copies the list when it is non-empty. I did not re-run this container, or the other two leftovers from the same pass, on v1.10.3.

One change

invoke_agent_websocket should load the same enabled ApprovalPolicy rows the HTTP handler loads, and invoke_agent_ws should take that list and copy it onto the runtime payload the way invoke_agent already does. Do it before session_start only in the sense that a failed auth still returns nothing. Do not invent a second policy language for the socket. An omitted key must mean "no enabled rows," not "this entrypoint forgot." Until that is true, an operator who tested the pause on the ordinary invoke has not tested the socket.

References

abraxaslabs.tech · github.com/abraxas · abraxas.null@proton.me